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Abstract 
This article evaluates the impact of private allegations of malpractice against cardiac 
surgeons on their patients’ outcomes and characteristics. While tort law may impact 
observable physician costs, malpractice allegations also impose hidden costs that could 
also affect physician behavior. We employ a large and multi-year panel dataset and 
patient-level analysis to ascertain whether malpractice allegations influence a surgeon’s 
practicing behavior.  Using a generalized difference-in-difference model that controls for 
unobserved patient heterogeneity, clustering of patients within surgeon offices, 
contemporaneous expected risk, and other patient variables, we measure whether an 
allegation of malpractices affects a physician’s service intensity and use of healthcare 
resources. Our results find no evidence that physician behavior was sensitive to 
allegations, findings of or settlements of malpractice claims. This is consistent with either 
low levels of defensive medicine in this specialty or pervasive and persistent practices—
including defensive medicine—that are not significantly impacted by actual claims filed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tort law reform that limits recoverable damages is predicated on the theory that 
reducing the costliness of negligence ought to reduce the practice of defensive medicine 
and reduce healthcare delivery costs. Yet while recent tort law reforms appear to have 
had a strong impact on reducing malpractice insurance premia, it has had little impact 
reducing the practice of defensive medicine. To reconcile these findings, Danzon (2000) 
suggested that the hidden costs of malpractice, such as psychic costs and loss of time 
defending malpractice allegations, are the primary drivers of defensive medicine, whereas 
tort reform only reduced observable costs.  
If the Danzon hypothesis is true, then the introduction of hidden costs would 
increase defensive medicine and change physician behavior even before observable 
public, monetary and reputational costs occur following the adjudication or settling of 
claims. We empirically test the impact of such private allegations of physician 
malpractice on the services the accused physicians deliver to patients and the consequent 
outcomes those patients exhibit. 
 
II. HIDDEN AND OBSERVABLE COSTS IN MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
A. Tort Law and Defensive Medicine 
Although tort law, in theory, should incent the provision of the appropriate 
standard of healthcare, many healthcare professionals and policymakers believe that the 
tort system instead induces the over-provision of care.  Specifically, recent scholarship 
has uncovered strong empirical evidence that the over-provision of care at the intensive 
margin and under-provision at the extensive margin may be unintended and costly 
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consequences of tort law (Shavell, 1984; Kessler & McClellan, 1996, 1997; Morrisey et 
al., 2008). 
Such ‘defensive medicine’, on the part of rational providers can be explained by 
uncertainty in the process of assigning costs to individual providers (Morrisey et al., 
2008). Anecdotal and empirical evidence exists that the medical negligence system 
operates poorly (Cranberg et al. 2007), contributing to such uncertainty (although many 
find that malpractice judgments accurately reflect malpractice (Studdert et al. 2006)). The 
tort system may also impose costs that are above those associated with compensation, 
including reputational costs and the costs of defending suits. Defensive medicine then 
reduces the risk of future litigation events, a plaintiff’s likelihood of success, and the 
defendant’s costs of litigation. 
Concern over costly ‘defensive medicine’ has led many legislatures to pass ‘tort 
reform’ laws that, among other things, limit the damages that can be awarded to tort 
victims (Avraham, 2007).  Reducing the costliness of negligence ought to thus reduce the 
practice of defensive medicine and reduce healthcare delivery costs (Hyman, 2007; 
Dranove & Gron, 2005; Mello et al., 2004). A separate objective of tort reform is to 
reduce the average premia of malpractice insurance as a direct consequence of lower total 
awarded damages (Black, Hyman et al., 2008). Anecdotally, sufficiently high rates of 
malpractice insurance may drive physicians out of delivery markets, although empirical 
evidence suggests this is a low risk (Yang et al 2008; Black, Hyman et al., 2008). 
Yet efforts at tort law reform appear to have had small impacts on the practice of 
defensive medicine (Studdert et al, 2004; CBO, 2004; Bobvjerg & Tancredi, 2005; 
Hellinger & Encinosa, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007; Sloan & Schadle, 2009; Waters, 2007), 
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while having strong impacts on the level of malpractice insurance premia (Kessler & 
McClellan, 1997; Morrisey et al., 2008; Sloan, 2003; Cline & Pepine 2004).  
These findings need to be reconciled. One explanation is that physician practice 
patterns are persistent over time and insensitive to the threat of tort suits,, although 
physician behavior has been shown to be responsive to therapeutic and incentive norms 
(Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007), militating against an explanation of simple persistence of 
practice.  Indeed, tort law reform with a potentially negative financial impact on 
physicians, such as the reform of the joint and several liability rules, has indeed been 
shown to have the expected effect of more cautionary physician behavior (Currie & 
Macleod 2008).  A related but more limited possibility is that defensive medicine is 
pervasive and is supported by both therapeutic norms and by financial incentives, even 
when the costs of negligence are reduced.  And yet another potential explanation is that 
the link between actual malpractice and an ultimate adverse judgment is sufficiently 
tenuous (Adams & Garber 2007), such that rational physicians do not change behavior in 
response to fears of future claims. 
 
B. The Hidden Costs of Malpractice Claims 
In this paper, we investigate an alternative explanation, suggested by Danzon 
(2000) and raised again by Morrisey et al. (2008), that the threat of hidden—rather than 
observable—costs of malpractice are the primary drivers of defensive medicine.  
This explanation supposes that a meaningful proportion of the overall expected 
cost of malpractice claims—that is, the costs to physicians that physicians thereby seek to 
avoid—is associated with the mere event of a tort action being commenced. Such costs 
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may, for example, include the non-financial costs of stress and the cognitive load of 
defending litigation (Morrissey et al, 2008), the lost time and associated direct financial 
costs from lost patient revenue or failure to develop a practice, and other reputational 
costs.  Additionally, these hidden costs could be heightened by common errors that take 
place in unsuccessful settlement negotiations (Kiser et al 2008). They may also include 
lost time and the associated direct financial costs from lost patient revenue or failure to 
develop a practice. Crucially, such costs are neither insurable nor recoverable, are borne 
entirely by the defendant provider and commence immediately on private receipt of an 
allegation of malpractice. 
Private and uninsurable costs of this nature could simultaneously explain both the 
reduction in malpractice premia and the small or insignificant impact on defensive 
medicine. Reform tends most directly to reduce a defendant’s insurance costs conditional 
on litigation than to reduce the likelihood of litigation. By construction, capped awards or 
collateral source offsets reduce payouts conditional on litigation (Black, Hyman et al., 
2008).  These reforms, however, do nothing to change the short-run hidden costs, 
including the stress and time lost time from dealing with a filed claim.  If these 
unobservable costs affect physician behavior, then we are more likely to detect 
behavioral changes following the initiation of malpractice claims (which are 
communicated privately) rather than following more public events, such as the filing of a 
lawsuit or the announcement of a settlement or judgment.   
 
C. Prior Research 
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We argue that the ‘private’ costs of malpractice are separate from and in addition 
to any later ‘public’ costs occasioned by reputational damage. Dranove et al (2008) 
investigate such public costs and find that publicly knowable events such as suit filings 
are associated with a less attractive payor mix in the twelve months subsequent to an 
obstetrician being sued.  Like us, Dranove et al (2008) assume that claimed malpractice 
has adverse effects on a physician, regardless of final disposition of the claim. We also 
consider the filing of a lawsuit per se as a negative reputational signal even though in our 
setting two of every five final decisions are not for the plaintiff and did not involve 
payment or court proceedings. 
Unlike us, Dranove et al’s model requires well-informed consumers and/or 
insurers observing external data and then rapidly changing preferences over providers or 
changing selective contracts with providers. Instead, we assume that a reported allegation 
of injury is immediately observable to the physician and occurs long before the public 
signal, if any, of a suit. For example, in our data, there is almost 1 year between the 
private reporting of an alleged claim and the public filing of a lawsuit. In more than 1 in 5 
claims in our sample, no lawsuit is filed and claims instead are dropped, settled or 
arbitrated. We assume that psychic costs occur following a claim even when no lawsuit is 
filed, but we note that this area is understudied, and the only empirical evidence through 
physician surveys have not supported this (Glassman et al, 1996). 
In this article, we seek to show that such private costs exist and have meaningful, 
exogenous effects on physician behavior. Our study uses patient-level data, which 
controls for patient heterogeneity, and examines whether malpractice claims induce 
Florida cardiac surgeons to increase the intensity and costs of health services to 
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subsequent patients. Gimm (2010) employed a similar physician-level model with Florida 
data and concluded that privately communicated claims did not affect C-section rates or 
the caseloads of Florida obstetricians.  But because of the limited spectrum of patients, 
that study was not ideal to control for patient heterogeneity, the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no impact may be due to omitted variables.   Since prior work has shown 
that there are complex relationships between typical malpractice risk in a geography and 
patient-level outcomes (Dhankhar et al 2007), patient-level data with patients exhibiting a 
diverse spectrum of conditions offers a better opportunity to test for hidden costs. 
We investigate these hypotheses using a detailed administrative discharge dataset 
comprising more than 220,000 cardiac surgeries performed by 314 operating cardiac 
surgeons in Florida between 1998 and 2006. Of these surgeons, 113 had patients who 
initiated malpractice claims in 1998-2006 that were subsequently reported to the Office 
of Insurance Regulation in Florida.  For each patient we have data on pre-existing risk 
factors, payor status, and in-hospital outcomes. We link surgeon identifiers to publicly 
available data on closed allegations of injury submitted by malpractice insurers to the 
Florida Office of Insurance Reform between 1994 and 2009. 
Malpractice claims data from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation are ideal 
to test this hypothesis because for each settled malpractice claim we have dates for each 
of the key events: the alleged occurrence, the report of alleged malpractice, the suit filing, 
and the disposition of the case.  We also have data on key outcomes, including the 
dispute resolution process, decision, and financial awards if any. We construct measures 
of lagged claim events (alleged occurrences, reports, filings and final dispositions) for 
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each surgeon over time and relate this to his or her contemporaneous patient-level 
charges, outcomes, payor status and ex ante patient risk. 
 Our main analytical approach uses a general difference-in-difference design to 
test the effects of allegations on patient-level charges and outcomes. We expect that more 
charges will be incurred without changes in outcomes in patients seen following the 
private report of an alleged injury. We do not expect that the filing of a lawsuit will lead 
to any changes, since we hypothesize that these have already been triggered by the earlier 
private report of injury.  Conversely, we expect the final disposition of an allegation to be 
followed by lower incurred charges. Crucially, we expect that a decision in favor or 
against the defendant at final disposition should make no difference to the measures of 
provider behavior we use, since any judgments are insurable costs.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Patient Level Data 
Our patient-level data is from the Agency for Health Care Administration in 
Florida, and represents all 229,153 records discharges for CABG performed in state-
regulated hospitals in the 36 quarters in 1998-2006. We excluded patient records where 
the hospital had admitted less than 5 records over the panel (20), where the patient’s age 
was less than 18 years (22), where the admitting hospital was unable to be matched to 
any known facility characteristics data (33), and where the operating medical practitioner 
was only observed one quarter (1,377). Almost all of these were singleton observations 
and likely data entry errors. 
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A further 1,661 patient records were discarded where the average number of cases 
per period per was 1 or less. A further 4,713 observations were dropped where publicly 
available information from the Florida department of health confirms that the operating 
medical license was a non-surgeon (e.g. an internist, or a cardiologist, or a family 
physician). These may be due either to erroneous data entry or assistants wrongly entered 
as the operating surgeon, or cases that had both major medical and surgical treatment. 
Finally, records were merged for 6 clearly identified (name, history) surgeons 
who held both a “Medical Faculty Certificate” and a “Medical Physician” license over 
the panel, treating patients under both licenses. This exclusion and validation reduced our 
data to 221,327 admission and 397 operating surgeons. 
 
B. Surgeon and Claim Level Data 
Our surgeon-level claims data are the reports of alleged error, omission or 
negligence by insured doctors held by the Office of Insurance Regulation in the Florida 
Department of Financial Services. In our data, insured doctors include allopathic 
physicians (i.e. MDs) as well as osteopathic and podiatric physicians. None of the 6 
osteopathic medical degree holding cardiac surgeons (with 1901.x license identifiers) or 
the one podiatric medical degree holding cardiac surgeon (2101.x) or any surgeons 
practicing exclusively under a medical faculty licensure (1508.x) had any closed claims 
recorded in this data. Most of these claims led to the filing of a lawsuit, most of which did 
not go to court (see Table 1). 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
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We consider only alleged injuries categorized as “significant harm” or worse. 
Specifically, these were death of the patient, grave harm (quadriplegia, severe brain 
damage, lifelong care or fatal prognosis), major harm (paraplegia, blindness, loss of two 
limbs, brain damage.) and significant harm (deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of 
one kidney or lung). The OIR data contained additional closed claims representing 
substantially less severe injuries. We chose not to include these to preserve homogeneity 
in the claim unit of analysis and since we expect the more severe claims to have the most 
impact on behavior. See https://apps.fldfs.com/PLCR/Search/MPLClaim.aspx for more 
details. 
The malpractice claims data includes four sequential categories of events related 
to malpractice claims (Figure 1). These comprise of (i) alleged injury occurrence 
detailing date, place, nature and allegedly responsible (retrospectively communicated at 
the time of the report), (ii) report of claim to a surgeon’s malpractice insurer and to the 
surgeon, (iii) filing of suit, if any, and (iv) final disposition of the claim. 
 
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
The data affords an opportunity to examine behavioral changes following the 
reporting of a claim while controlling for any subsequent suit or award. We thus are able 
to test the independent effect of the reporting of such a claim and its associated costs, 
such as the stress of resolving an ongoing action, costs (both dollars and time spent) 
disputing the claim, and other psychic and monetary costs.  These costs are thus separated 
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from the more conventional direct (i.e. damages) and indirect (i.e. reputational harm) 
costs of malpractice litigation. These more conventional direct and indirect costs were 
investigated by Dranove et al. (2008) who find that publicly knowable events such as suit 
filings are associated with a less attractive payor mix in the twelve months subsequent to 
an obstetrician being sued. 
Of the 397 cardiac surgeons in our panel, 250 have no closed claims recorded at 
all in the fifteen-year interval from 1994 to 2009 spanned by our malpractice insurance 
surgeon-level data. A further eleven surgeons have all their closed claims comprise 
events which all happened outside the nine year interval from 1998 to 2006 spanned by 
our patient-level admission data. We restrict our analysis to procedures occurring no later 
than 2006 because many claims require as many as three years to resolve and claims 
enter the Florida database only once closed, thus malpractice claims reported in 2007-
2009 are unlikely to be in the data.   
As a preliminary matter, we confirm a strong positive association between a 
physician’s number of closed claims and his/her total volume (Pearson correlation 0.273, 
p<.001). We excluded 83 surgeons on the basis of implausibly low annual volume (< 10 
cases) and low participation (e.g. one quarter a year for three years). These surgeons are 
unrepresentative of the typical surgeon. They are likely to have major non-Floridian 
practices (e.g. in Georgia or Alabama, or if practicing at Mayo’s Florida campus they 
may practice further afield at the main Rochester, MN campus), or practicing 
concurrently in non-state-regulated hospitals (e.g. the Veterans’ Administration 
hospitals). Our data use agreement forbids us from contacting the surgeons to explore 
this. Compared to the included surgeons, the excluded surgeons had lower average settled 
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claims (0.45 versus 0.67; two-tailed t test p = .076) and lower average number of events 
observed in the panel (0.82 versus 1.26; two-tailed t test p = .038). These small 
differences were not consistent with an alternative explanation that the excluded surgeons 
had exited the panel as a result of alleged injuries sustained by their patients. 
The effect of these exclusion criteria was to reduce total surgeons to 314, and the 
number of patient records to 220,843. The total number of closed claims observed is 211 
claims, and 113 surgeons had at least one closed claim from which 89 surgeons 
experienced at least one suit. 
We reconstruct a summary dataset of malpractice claims using the 
surgeon*quarter as unit of observation with the twelve month lagged total of each of the 
four malpractice events. This lagging further reduced final regression observations to 
185,849 patient records and 296 surgeons.  This summary data, reported in Table 2, 
includes alleged occurrences, of private reports, of filed suits, and of final dispositions 
(which were distinguished by decisions for the plaintiff or for the defendant). We observe 
but don’t analyze the size of monetary damages.  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
We merged these data with the patient-level data: for each patient admission we 
are able to relate patient-level dependent variables to lagged surgeon-level flows of 
malpractice ‘events’. We present surgeon-level summary histograms of lagged event 
flows in Table 3 and Figures 2a-e, respectively. 
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<< INSERT FIGURES 2a-e ABOUT HERE >> 
 
C. Variables 
We study the incidence of the following binary events: prolonged mechanical 
ventilation, in-hospital mortality, discharge destination not home. The latter includes all 
live discharges who have some degree of home healthcare, or who were discharged to 
sub-acute and convalescent hospitals or nursing homes. Additionally we examined the 
following continuous events, using the natural logarithmic transformation of length of 
stay, operating room, non-operating room and total charges.
1
  These are assorted 
measures of treatment intensity and serve as our dependent variables. 
                                                 
1
 We did not have data on hospital reimbursements for claimed services, but the 
discharge data did contain itemized charges representing the product of list prices per 
service and a range of itemized services. As long as we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity among individual hospitals in setting such charges, and for secular trends 
in the list prices, these charges likely amount to an accurate measure of hospital-site 
service intensity.  We do not deflate these charges for several reasons. Our use of 
calendar fixed effects should control for statewide secular trends, and our use of hospital 
fixed effects mitigates some time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in setting charges at 
the individual hospital level. Another reason not to deflate these charges is that they do 
not represent actual cash flows, but rather list prices. It is not immediately clear whether 
inflation in list prices tracks the producer price indexes that could be used for deflation 
purposes. 
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We also computed a measure of ex ante risk by fitting a parsimonious logit 
regression on the binary outcome of in-hospital death controlling for the independent 
variables below (pseudo R
2
 of 0.18, C-statistic of 0.83). The high area under the receiver 
operating curve suggests some over-fitting: that is, some of the covariates are possibly ex 
interim correlates of in-hospital mortality, as opposed to ex ante predictors. The predicted 
values from this regression for all patients identify changes in the risk profile of a 
surgeon’s practice.  
We utilize a large number of control variables from the administrative discharge 
data. Patient demographics (age, gender, non-white race), acuity (emergency 
presentation, transfer from another hospital), and payor status (government payor) help 
control for patient morbidity. We also link patient county of residence information to 
2005 Census Bureau data on county proportions over 65 years, below poverty level and 
with bachelor degree, as well as median family income. There were also a large number 
of comorbidities (plausibly present at time of admission, although this is not known for 
sure).  
To these focal variables we add one more control: the lagged number of cases the 
surgeon performed in the prior twelve months before the current quarter of the patient’s 
admission. We do this to ensure that experience or scale economies do not confound the 
effect of malpractice allegations. 
 
D. Statistical Model 
We specified a reduced form model of the impact of lagged malpractice 
allegations on aspects of a surgeon’s current patient admission. Our patient-level 
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regressions are linear probability models for binary dependent and ordinary least squares 
for continuous dependent variables. In unreported analyses we also specified probit 
models for the binary dependent variables, but these did not qualitatively change the 
reported results. 
For patients indexed by i, treated by operating surgeon s, in hospital h admitted in 
quarterly period q of year t we estimate the following using ordinary least squares with 
robust standard errors clustered by operating surgeon: 
 
yishq =  + Xi + Xs +  h + t + ihq 
 
The to-be-estimated vector  estimates the marginal effects of the focal variables of 
interest Xs, a (5x1) vector with generic element 
4
j=1(Lq-j), where L represents a quarterly 
flow of cases, alleged occurrences of malpractice, reports of alleged malpractice, 
malpractice suits filed and closed claims, respectively. 
Independent variables comprise calendar year fixed effects t, 74 hospital fixed 
effects h as well as a vector of patient controls Xi (age, gender, non-white race, 
emergency presentation, transfer from another hospital, government payor, a large 
number of comorbidities and several county-level ecological variables from 2005 Census 
Bureau data on county proportions over 65 years, below poverty level  and with bachelor 
degree, as well as median family income.).  
Table 3 summarizes patient-weighted means of dependent and focal independent 
variables. Covariates and summary statistics are shown in Table 4, and a linear regression 
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of these on in-hospital mortality showed no substantial multicollinearity (maximum VIF 
of 4.4, mean VIF of 1.4). 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional variation only. If patients 
select surgeons on the basis of publicly observable information on L, then an omitted 
variable bias may impact our estimates of. Since our interest is in privately-known 
surgeon-level events, this source of potential bias may not be too serious. 
However, if a surgeon chooses to treat patients with lower risk (and hence with 
exogenously lower charges and better outcomes) after some event in L, then clearly   
could be biased towards zero. We computed a measure of ex ante risk by fitting a 
parsimonious logit regression on the binary outcome of in-hospital death. We then 
checked for changes in patient risk, treating the ex-ante patient expected risk as a 
dependent variable analogously to the other dependent variables, but found no evidence 
of such changes (see Table 5, first column). Ideally, we should like to instrument for the 
events in L, but we were not able to conceive of a suitably exogenous proxy for 
individual surgeon allegation susceptibility. 
We used Stata v10 for all data management and statistical analyses. We 
considered p values of 0.05 significant and report only two-sided tests. We report 
estimated parameters both with robust standard errors and with robust standard errors 
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clustered by operating surgeon. We did not correct for multiple comparisons (Rothman 
1990). Our institution’s Health System Institutional Review Board approved this study. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
In Table 5 we report the marginal impact of a surgeon’s additional claim event in 
the twelve months prior to the admission of the current patient. Columns represent 
separate regressions on separate dependent variables. We suppress reporting of the 
control covariates. Our measure of lagged cases (representing either or both of experience 
or scale economies) was highly significant and associated with a reduction in length of 
stay and hospital charges, and a reduction in the probability of prolonged mechanical 
ventilation, death in-hospital and discharge elsewhere than directly home.  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
However, our focal variables of lagged malpractice events – whether private 
occurrences or reports, or public filings and dispositions – were not consistently 
associated with any of the patient outcomes in Table 5. Given the number of 
comparisons, the four coefficients estimated at p-values just below and just above .05 are 
likely due to chance alone. In particular, we find no evidence that the private occurrences 
and private reports of alleged malpractice impact patient charges.  
The outcomes we investigate in Table 5 span both the mortality (averaging 3.8%) 
and serious morbidity in cardiac surgery. It is well-known that as many as 3% of CABG 
patients suffer strokes, around 2% experience kidney damage severe enough to require 
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dialysis, and a further 3% survive a prolonged chest wall wound site infection (Eagle et 
al, 2004). In the panel, the incidence of these unobserved major morbidity events may 
lead to longer length of stay (average 10.2 days), discharge elsewhere than home 
(20.8%), and prolonged mechanical ventilation greater than 96 hours (2.9%). We found 
no evidence that any patient outcomes were affected by any of the sequence of events 
from alleged occurrence through to final disposition.  
This is fails to support the putative mechanism of private stress and distractions 
causing defensive medicine (Danzon 2000). On the other hand, publicly observable 
signals of lawsuits also have no apparent impact on treatment service intensity either, 
unlike in Dranove et al’s (2008) setting. 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
In Table 6, we examine whether the payor status of the current patient was 
associated with lagged malpractice allegations on the part of the patient’s surgeon. After 
the private alleged occurrence of malpractice in the prior 12 months before the quarter of 
the patient’s admission, a patient was slightly less likely to have private indemnity 
insurance (p  <.05).  After closed claims decided or settled against the surgeon, there was 
a slight reduction (increase) in the probability that a patient had PPO (HMO) insurance, 
both p <.05. 
Finally, following prior scholarship (Dranove et al., 2008; Gimm, 2010), we also 
constructed physician-level models in addition to the patient-level models above. Prior 
work used linear regression in surgeon-level aggregate analyses to relate public 
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malpractice suit filings to subsequent changes in surgeon caseload and payor 
composition, and has also examined the correlation between malpractice events within a 
physician over time (Bovbjerg & Petronis 1994). 
In our setting there was substantial positive serial correlation in the physician-
level aggregates series and significant unobserved surgeon-level effects. Controlling for 
these with an assumed first-order auto-regressive function error structure and a surgeon 
fixed effects panel model, we found no significant relationship between the lagged flows 
of claim events and subsequent surgeon caseload, payor mix or ex ante patient risk. 
Finally, we also found no differences between analyses restricted to patients in the 
1998-2003 period or to the 2004-2006 period. The latter period marked the institution of 
damages caps and other tort law reforms that passed Florida’s state house in the final 
months of 2003. This may be due to the long tail of existing claims not bound by the new 
law; future re-analysis may show that claims first reported after the law change did have 
an impact on behavior. In other unreported analysis, we repeated all the charges analyses 
using Winsorized charges to remove the influence of far outliers, but results remained 
qualitatively unchanged. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Our study failed to show that cardiac surgeons, practicing in Florida over a recent 
nine-year period, increased the intensity of or otherwise changed attributes of the 
healthcare services they rendered in response to a recent malpractice claim, suit, or 
settlement. 
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Our analytical strategy attempted to identify such practices off of substantial 
variation across surgeons in the flow of claim events, inferring surgeon behavior off of 
changes in patient-level outcomes, risk, and payor status or hospital charges. We found 
very modest evidence of decreases in patient charges following final dispositions in favor 
of a surgeon, and unfavorable changes in patient payor mix following dispositions 
against a surgeon. There were no statistically persuasive changes in patient costs or 
outcomes associated with private reports.  
These findings have a number of possible explanations.  First, it is possible that 
the physicians do respond to the initiation of malpractice claims but exhibit a response 
that cannot easily be discerned even in such a large and long panel dataset. That is, the 
‘impulse response function’ associated with an allegation of malpractice may be too 
muted. This could occur, for example, if the ‘signal’ of an allegation is too weak or too 
diffuse, or if provider patterns of practice resist rapid change.  
Relatedly, surgeons might anticipate the threat of a tort action and thus adjust 
their levels of care—and their provision of defensive medicine—before any malpractice 
claim is filed.  Thus, a behavioral change cannot be detected because physicians—
regardless of whether an action is filed against them—operate within the shadow of the 
tort system.  
Alternatively, malpractice claims might be sufficiently pervasive—or the ‘signal’ 
of an allegation in its identification of a particular surgeon might be too weak or 
imprecise—that many physicians in our sample believe that their conduct cannot affect 
the likelihood of a subsequent tort action.  We note that in the three major east coast 
counties in Florida, 94% of cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons have been sued, with ‘an 
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average of 2.1 past lawsuits each…, an average of 1.5 lawsuits pending and an average 
total of 3.6 lawsuits each so far in their career’ (Palmisano 2004, p10). 
Under this perspective, the uncertainty and imprecision of malpractice law—i.e. 
its inability to target only physicians who act negligently—impose significant social 
costs, including but not limited to pervasive defensive medicine.  Similarly, the problem 
of determining negligence when multiple parties (e.g. an independent physician and a 
hospital) both dilutes the incremental legal liability attributable to the surgeon and creates 
a cloud of potential liability within collaborative conduct. 
Such collaboration in medical care—and in producing medical errors—is 
common.  In an analysis of patient claims alleging general surgical errors, 62% of errors 
involved more than one physician (Rogers et al., 2006). Collaborative conduct also 
invites invoking flexible doctrines such as ‘apparent authority’ liability and vicarious 
liability, which further obscure the allocation of liability.  Consequently, surgeons might 
seek to decrease their expected liability by coordinating care with other legal entities 
even though such coordination often leads to lower quality of care. 
The specialist surgical literature documents adverse patient and hospital outcomes 
associated with increased hand-offs and blurring of responsibility in multi-specialty 
teams (Williams et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2006). Greenberg et al. (2007) identify serious 
communications breakdowns as typically involving verbal communication between a 
dyad comprising the senior surgical staff and another caregiver.  Such related concerns 
over the fragmentation of medical care (Elhauge, 2010) and the imprecision of 
malpractice law have convinced many to seek enterprise liability tort reforms 
(Havighurst, 2000; Arlen & McLeod, 2003). 
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Finally, it is also possible that provider practice patterns exhibit such persistence 
that even correctly perceived informative signals are not able to drive change rapidly 
enough. The extensive literature on small-area variations in physician behavior is 
consistent with highly persistent idiosyncratic physician behavior. A long stream of work 
has looked at how practice patterns persist, and how peers, guidelines and other source of 
information may change these (Escarce, 1997, Valente & Davis, 1999; Majumdar et al, 
2002; 2004). Research on peer effects and key opinion leadership in healthcare delivery 
also suggests the difficulty of changing the practices of individual physicians (Berwick, 
2003; Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007). Our strategy explicitly assumes that events in the prior 
twelve months are able to affect change, but this may simply be too short a period to 
observe changes in physician conduct.  This might suggest that the malpractice system 
does a poor job of deterring negligent conduct, even if it still might play an insurance role 
by providing compensation to injured parties. 
Our study has several important limitations. We narrowly focus on one treatment 
within one specialty within one state. Yet this is a disease area where past research has 
found some evidence for defensive medicine identified off of reform (Kessler & 
McClellan, 1996; 1997) and a state where recent research (Dranove et al, 2008) has 
demonstrated some behavioral changes among obstetricians following suits.  
On the other hand, our focus on one state blurs well-known small area variations 
(Wennberg & Cooper 1999; Huesch 2010) in patient outcomes and similar variations in 
claiming frequencies related to family income (Hart & Peters 2008) or the level of 
expected damages related to county poverty rates or income inequality (Kohler-Hausman 
2011). While we controlled for hospital-level fixed effects that are likely closely 
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correlated with such small area-level effects, the effect of other related but omitted 
variables is not known. 
Our data on claims is a right-censored sample. Given the mean four year period 
between alleged injury and final disposition, there are likely to be some open claims 
related to our panel not captured in the OIR data through November 2009. Additional 
ascertainment bias may exist if surgeons who ‘go bare’ (i.e. do not carry malpractice 
insurance and accept the risk of bankruptcy) give rise to unobserved claims. A related 
limitation of our data is that we do not observe events such as early offers of settlement 
occurring between initial notification of a claim and subsequent events. There is some 
conflicting empirical evidence whether such early offers may reduce defense costs (Black 
et al 2009). Our data was unable to capture this claim-level granularity. 
The Florida Medical Association additionally cautions that “the settlement of 
malpractice claims occurs for a variety of reasons, which do not necessarily reflect 
negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the individual provider or 
institution. Payment of a claim should not be a presumption that malpractice has 
occurred. Physicians often have little control over whether the insurance company pays 
an award.” (Florida Medical Association) 
While our data on hospital charges seem a noisy but unbiased proxy for treatment 
intensity, they are clearly upper bounds on actual payments. Thus we do not actually 
know the estimated changes in per patient payments associated with the estimated 
changes in per patient charges. A related major limitation is that we do not observe 
physician charges. Our outcomes are in-hospital only, and our estimates of no changes in 
patient outcomes might change if we looked at 30 day mortality or 1 year survival. 
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We fail to reject the hypothesis that hidden costs, such as those imposed by the 
reporting of a malpractice claim, do not induce physicians to prescribe additionally 
defensive and costly care.  We additionally fail to detect whether observable costs, such 
as the filing of a malpractice lawsuit or the release of a malpractice settlement, similarly 
affect physician behavior.  We interpret the results from our null study and those in other 
recent articles (Sloan & Schadle, 2009; Morrisey et al., 2008; Gimm, 2010) to suggest 
that malpractice claims have little effect on physician behavior and healthcare costs.  
Perhaps this is because physicians operate within the shadowed threat of 
malpractice claims before any claims or suits are filed against them, such that they cannot 
provide additionally defensive medicine following a claim, suit, or judgment.  This would 
suggest that malpractice claims might not exacerbate defensive medicine because such 
defensive over-provision of care is already widespread. Alternatively, physicians might 
be unresponsive to malpractice actions because physician behavior is inflexible and 
unresponsive to the threat of liability.  This would suggest that defensive medicine might 
not be as pervasive as tort reformers might think, and that the tort system is a poor device 
to incent physicians and improve healthcare quality. Both of these conclusions are 
observationally equivalent. 
Well-intentioned tort law reform may thus reduce the costs of negligence and thus 
reduce malpractice insurance premiums, but there is little evidence to suggest it affects 
outcomes in the healthcare delivery and financing markets. Changing practice patterns 
through other financial incentives, information (e.g. on cost, effectiveness, evidence 
bases), peer review, and judicious implementation of technology-enabled quality 
controls, audits and decision support may be promising policy alternatives. 
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Table 1: Claim-level Events  
 
 
Alleged occurences 211
Reported claims, of which: 211
Led to filed suit, of which: 165
Dropped/no court proceedings recorded 21
Settled for defendant 2
Settled for plaintiff 0
Did not proceed 19
Arbitrated 1
Found for defendant 1
Found for plaintiff 0
Settled 113
Settled for defendant 14
Settled for plaintiff 99
Went to court 30
Found for defendant 14
Found for plaintiff 2
Dropped/did not proceed 14
Did not lead to suit filed, of which: 46
Arbitrated 2
Found for defendant 0
Found for plaintiff 2
Dropped/no court proceedings recorded 14
Settled for defendant 0
Settled for plaintiff 0
Did not proceed 14
Settled 30
Settled for defendant 7
Settled for plaintiff 23
Closed claims 211
Note: Claim-level counts for analysis dataset.
Counts
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Figure 1: Timeline and Typical Sequence of Events Analyzed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alleged occurrence of 
injury due to malpractice 
by physician
Private report alleging 
injury communicated 
to physician
Public filing of 
malpractice 
lawsuit against 
physician
25 months
Note: This sequence of events is only observed if a claim is made (some allegations are resolved through pre-emptive
settlements and are not recorded by the OIR database) and the claim was closed by November, 2009, when we accessed the
Closed Claims OIR database. Values in months indicate mean durations in our data.
Claim            
withdrawn, 
settled, decided in 
court or in 
arbitration
      10 months14 months
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Table 2: Surgeon-level Focal Independent Variables  
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Surgeon's lagged CABG cases (#, prior 4 quarters) 95.2           68.5           3 351.5        
Surgeon's lagged events (#, prior 4 quarters)
Alleged occurences 0.06           0.12 0 0.94           
Reported claims 0.05           0.10 0 0.73           
Filed suits 0.05           0.09 0 0.60           
Closed claims (against surgeon) 0.03           0.07 0 0.57           
Closed claims (for surgeon) 0.02           0.05 0 0.30           
Note: Surgeon-level unweighted means for 296 surgeons in regressions.
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Figure 2a: Histogram of Surgeon-Level Lagged Claim Events, Alleged Incidents 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Reported Claims 
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Figure 2c: Filed Suits 
 
 
 
Figure 2d: Dispositions Against Surgeon 
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Figure 2e: Dispositions In Favor of Surgeon 
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Table 3: Patient-weighted Dependent and Focal Independent Variables  
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Median (25-75 centiles)
Ex ante variables (%)
Expected in-hospital mortality 3.9             6.6             
Payor status: Medicare 50.4           50.0           
PPO 12.6           33.2           
HMO 12.0           32.5           
MedicareMC 11.8           32.2           
Indemnity 4.2             20.1           
Medicaid 2.1             14.2           
Medicaid HMO 0.8             9.0             
Outcomes (%)
Prolonged mech. Ventilation 3.0             16.9           
In-hospital mortality 3.8             19.1           
Discharged not directly/alone home 21.3           40.9           
Length of stay (days) 10.3           8.8             8   (6 - 12)
Hospital itemized charges ($)
Total 99,432      81,401      77,816  (55,489 - 116,319)
Operating room only 18,993      14,078      14,661  (10,056 - 23,260)
Non-operating room 80,439      75,438      61,130  (41,964 - 93,333)
Surgeon's lagged CABG cases (#, prior 4 quarters) 168.8        76.3           
Surgeon's lagged events (#, prior 4 quarters)
Alleged occurences 0.08           0.28           
Reported claims 0.09           0.31           
Filed suits 0.07           0.28           
Closed claims (against surgeon) 0.05           0.22           
Closed claims (for surgeon) 0.03           0.18           
Note: Patient-weighted means for 185,849 observations in regressions. Twelve months lagged
predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Control Covariates  
  
Mean Std. Dev.
Age (years) 67.5                   10.7                   
Female 29.0                   45.4                   
Non-white 9.4                     29.1                   
Emergency 25.0                   43.3                   
Transfer 42.4                   49.4                   
Government payor 65.9                   47.4                   
County - bachelor degree 24.8                   5.4                     
Elderly 18.1                   6.0                     
Below poverty level 12.4                   2.7                     
Family income median ($) 42,904              4,647                
Known coronary artery disease 95.0                   21.8                   
Hypertension 54.9                   49.8                   
Dysrhythmiae 38.6                   48.7                   
Unstable angina 35.9                   48.0                   
Diabetes mellitus 29.4                   45.6                   
Acue myocardial infarction 25.9                   43.8                   
Congestive heart failure 23.8                   42.6                   
Chronic obstructive lung disease 20.0                   40.0                   
Fluid disorder 14.4                   35.1                   
Concurrent valve operation 13.7                   34.4                   
Coagulopathy 10.7                   31.0                   
Angina 10.6                   30.8                   
Complications of hypertension 7.3                     26.1                   
Conduction disorder 6.3                     24.2                   
Ventricular tachycardia 4.9                     21.6                   
Carditis 2.9                     16.7                   
Pumonary artery heart disease 2.7                     16.2                   
Aneurysms 2.4                     15.3                   
Cerebrovascular disease 1.7                     13.0                   
Chronic kidney disease 1.7                     12.8                   
Liver disease 1.1                     10.3                   
Transient ischemic attacks 0.4                     6.2                     
2000 14.6                   35.3                   
2001 14.1                   34.8                   
2002 13.3                   34.0                   
2003 11.9                   32.4                   
2004 11.6                   32.0                   
2005 10.8                   31.0                   
2006 9.6                     29.4                   
Note: Patient-weighted means (%, unless otherwise indicated) for 185,849
observations in regressions. Twelve months lagged predictors explains
reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
Excluded calendar year indicator: 1999. County ecological variables merged
in from 2005 Census Bureau data for Florida county of patient's residence,
set to mean where out of state or missing.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Impact of Lagged Surgeon Claim Events on Patient Risk, Hospital Charges and Outcomes 
 
Expected in-
hospital 
mortality
Log Length 
of stay
Log OR 
charges
Log Non-
OR charges
Ventilation 
> 96 hours
Died in-
hospital
Discharge 
not 
directly 
home
Patient controls
Calendar and facility fixed effects
Caseload, last 4 quarters 0.0000 ¶ -0.0004 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0002 ***
(0.0000)        (0.0001)      (0.0001)      (0.0001)      (0.0000)       (0.0000)      (0.0000)      
Lagged # events, last 4 quarters
Alleged incident malpractice 0.0002 0.0044 0.0092 -0.0115 0.0002 0.0009 -0.0051
(0.0003)        (0.0061)      (0.0185)      (0.0107)      (0.0016)       (0.0019)      (0.0046)      
Reported claims 0.0001 -0.0037 0.0154 0.0043 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0037
(0.0003)        (0.0050)      (0.0182)      (0.0110)      (0.0016)       (0.0015)      (0.0065)      
Filed suits -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0004 0.0030 ¶ -0.0016
(0.0003)        (0.0083)      (0.0173)      (0.0093)      (0.0015)       (0.0017)      (0.0050)      
Closed claims (against surgeon) 0.0001 0.0019 0.0123 0.0200 ¶ 0.0017 0.0015 -0.0056
(0.0003)        (0.0073)      (0.0262)      (0.0113)      (0.0023)       (0.0031)      (0.0068)      
Closed claims (for surgeon) -0.0002 0.0087 -0.0278 -0.0289 * -0.0004 0.0052 * -0.0005
(0.0005)        (0.0097)      (0.0275)      (0.0136)      (0.0029)       (0.0024)      (0.0075)      
R2 76.5% 38.6% 71.5% 64.6% 8.1% 9.0% 24.8%
Observations 185,849       185,625     185,081     185,849     185,849       185,849     185,849     
Note: Regressions on column dependent variables. Estimates and (below) robust standard errors clustered by operating cardiac surgeon. Estimated parameters significant
at (***) p<.001; (**) p<.01; (*) p<.05; and (¶) p<.10. Twelve patient demographic and ecological covariates, 22 comorbidity covariates, 8 calendar year fixed effects and 74
facility fixed effects included in all  specifications. Twelve months lagged predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
          Included in all specifications
         "
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Table 6: Regression Results for Impact of Lagged Surgeon Claim Events on Focal Patient Payor Status 
 
PPO HMO FFS
Medicare 
MC
Medicare 
FFS
Medicaid
Medicaid 
HMO
Patient controls
Calendar and facility fixed effects
Caseload, last 4 quarters 4.76E-05 * 1.43E-05 -3.45E-06 5.35E-05 -3.10E-06 -3.78E-05 *** -1.91E-05 **
(1.88E-05) (2.32E-05) (1.03E-05) (5.40E-05) (6.33E-05) (8.71E-06) (6.36E-06)
Lagged # events, last 4 quarters
Alleged incident malpractice -0.0030 0.0076 -0.0040 * 0.0009 0.0029 -0.0023 ¶ 0.0015
(0.0025)    (0.0050)  (0.0018)  (0.0061)  (0.0057)  (0.0013)  (0.0021)  
Reported claims 0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0048 -0.0023 0.0010 -0.0027 *
(0.0036)    (0.0045)  (0.0020)  (0.0057)  (0.0043)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  
Filed suits -0.0010 0.0082 ¶ -0.0016 -0.0135 ¶ 0.0120 * 0.0004 -0.0007
(0.0030)    (0.0048)  (0.0021)  (0.0071)  (0.0061)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  
Closed claims (against surgeon) -0.0085 * 0.0171 * -0.0018 -0.0083 0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0016
(0.0041)    (0.0074)  (0.0021)  (0.0072)  (0.0070)  (0.0013)  (0.0016)  
Closed claims (for surgeon) -0.0042 0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0018 0.0065 0.0011 -0.0004
(0.0080)    (0.0083)  (0.0032)  (0.0118)  (0.0099)  (0.0017)  (0.0026)  
R2 14.8% 15.7% 7.3% 13.3% 36.1% 4.8% 3.2%
Observations
          Included in all specifications
          "
185,849
Note: Linear probability model; regression on indicator for patient payor status. Estimates and (below) robust standard errors clustered by operating cardiac
surgeon. Estimated parameters significant at (***) p<.001; (**) p<.01; (*) p<.05; and (¶) p<.10. Twelve patient demographic and ecological covariates, 22 comorbidity
covariates, 8 year fixed effects and 74 facility fixed effects included. Note 'government payor' control omitted from all specifications. Twelve months lagged
predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
